Chapter 1 reviews what strategy consisted of in the twentieth century and what makes the twenty-first century so different.
Chapter 2 considers what makes the United States itself different, as well as what the differences among us mean for national security. We argue that we are becoming increasingly divisible, creating a vulnerability clever adversaries can exploit.
Chapter 3 introduces sovereignty as a frame of reference for global order. We explain what strengthening state responsibility would entail, what it would do for the United States, and what the United States would have to do in order to make it work.
Chapter 4 describes the ways in which reinvigorating sovereignty would change how international relations are conceived and conducted. One of our recurrent themes is that putting teeth back into accountability and responsibility would advantage the United States in myriad ways, including military ways – but only if we Americans accept updated realities about twenty-first-century warfare
Chapter 5 presents arguments for why the United States needs to return to Declarations of War, why it is important that Americans reconsider Just War Theory, and how such a reassessment would lead to a different set of metrics for defining who should and should not be considered a combatant in future conflict.
Chapter 6 offers a number of ways in which the United States might mature the American vision of war. We revisit issues of national identity and cohesiveness.
Chapter 7 makes clear that the “don’t tread on me – to each his own” foundation on which sovereignty rests liberates every country to set its own course with no more browbeating by the U.S. government. This chapter explores how liberal an approach this really is and what a true respect for others’ cultures means. Specifically, we focus on foreign aid and assistance, and education and training.
Chapter 8 broadens the aid and assistance discussion by reviewing sovereignty’s implications for alliances and multilateral agreements.
Chapter 9 considers the implications of this strategy for the application of military force.
In the Conclusion we remind readers that reinvigorating sovereignty is not neo-isolationaist and that what we are really arguing for is the application of a single golden rule, equally applicable inside and outside states, but one that does not rely on values the United States mistakenly presumes to be universal.
